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GOOGLE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Google moves for summary judgment on the grounds 
that all of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Section 230 of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230, and the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and because there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and Google is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF GOOGLE’S MOTION 
Google’s search engine helps millions of people more efficiently find what they are look-
ing for on the Internet. Search results reflect Google’s editorial judgments about what infor-
mation is most relevant and responsive to users’ search queries. But some websites use deceptive 
tactics (called “webspam”) to try to trick their way to the top of results pages. Webspam de-
grades the quality of search results, making it harder for users to obtain high-quality information 
and crowding out better websites that play by the rules. Google works hard to fight this abuse, 
including by excluding from search results websites found engaging in it. 
That is what happened here. In September 2014, Google removed from its search results 
366 websites operated by e-ventures. Google took that action after an investigation led by the 
most experienced member of its search quality team found that e-ventures’ websites were violat-
ing Google’s webspam policies. Those violations were obvious, serious, and widespread. They 
involved countless artificial links to and from e-ventures’ websites, content cut and pasted from 
other sites, and dozens of duplicate sites with no evident purpose other than to fool users. And 
this was all happening on a large scale, across hundreds of websites under common control. Re-
moving these websites was a “clear-cut” application of Google’s rules. Falls Decl., Ex. 17. In-
deed, shortly after the removal, e-ventures was told by its own consultant that its sites were
Willen Decl., Ex. 9.  
Nevertheless, after e-ventures worked to clean up several of its websites, Google re-
stored them to search results. That should have been the end of the matter. Instead, Plaintiff 
Case 2:14-cv-00646-PAM-CM   Document 138   Filed 12/01/16   Page 7 of 31 PageID 1111
-2- 
brought this lawsuit, seeking tens of millions of dollars in damages because Google enforced its 
established policies to stop e-ventures’ efforts to manipulate Google’s search engine and deceive 
its users. Google is entitled to summary judgment.  
Plaintiff’s whole case is barred by federal law. Section 230 of the CDA establishes a 
“broad statutory immunity,” Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2006), 
which “protects from liability any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to ex-
clude material that third parties seek to post online.” Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1103 
(9th Cir. 2009). That is exactly the situation here. Google’s decision to remove e-ventures’ web-
sites for engaging in deceptive tactics in violation of Google’s policies reflects the “exercise of a 
publisher’s traditional editorial functions”—and lawsuits seeking to hold internet service provid-
ers liable for such functions “are barred.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 
1997). This robust federal immunity protects Google not just against liability, but also against the 
burdens of further litigation in this case. 
Google’s removal decision is also protected by the First Amendment. Deciding what 
websites to include in search results is an editorial judgment, no less than a newspaper’s decision 
about what articles to publish. Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437-39 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). While the Court agreed that “search engine output results are protected by the First 
Amendment,” it allowed Plaintiff’s claims to survive based on the allegations that Google acted 
with “anti-competitive motives” and that “the representations made by Google that e-ventures 
pages violate Google’s policies are false.” Dkt. 86, at 15-17. But these allegations are baseless. 
The undisputed evidence shows that Google acted because it concluded that e-ventures’ web-
sites were engaged in webspam. No jury could conclude there was an improper motive or mali-
cious falsehood associated with that judgment. Plaintiff cannot overcome Google’s First 
Amendment right to decide what websites to include in its search results.  
Beyond these overriding federal immunities, summary judgment is warranted because 
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Plaintiff cannot carry its burden of supporting any of its claims on the merits. Plaintiff’s Lanham 
Act claim requires a showing that Google made a misleading statement about the “affiliation” or 
“association” between Google and e-ventures, or about the “origin, sponsorship, or approval” 
of Google’s services or commercial activities. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). There is nothing like 
that here. Plaintiff also has no viable claim under FDUTPA because there is nothing in the rec-
ord that supports the allegation that Google removed e-ventures’ websites “for anticompetitive 
and punitive reasons” (Dkt. 86, at 22) or engaged in any deceptive practice. Finally, the tortious 
interference claim is barred by Florida’s “single action” rule, as it is based on the same facts as 
Plaintiff’s failed defamation claim, and because there is no evidence that Google “wrongfully and 
intentionally harmed” any of e-ventures’ business relationships (Dkt. 86, at 26-27). 
The Court allowed e-ventures’ claims to survive a motion to dismiss to see whether 
Plaintiff could come forward with evidence to support the allegations in its complaint. Plaintiff 
has not come close to doing so. There is no basis for letting this case go to trial, and doing so 
would erode the robust protections that Congress and the Constitution provide to Google for 
the editorial decisions it makes about what information to include in its search results.  
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
A. Google’s Search Engine, Webspam, and the Webmaster Guidelines 
Google’s search engine indexes billions of websites from across the Internet. Falls Decl. 
¶2. In response to users’ search queries, Google scans its index and returns a list of websites that 
reflects Google’s editorial judgment about what information will be most relevant and useful. Id. 
¶¶2-3. This judgment determines both what websites appear in search results for a given query 
and how those websites are ordered (or “ranked”) within those results. Id.; White Decl. ¶3.  
Some website operators try to undermine Google’s editorial judgments by using tactics 
intended to artificially boost the ranking of their sites. Falls Decl. ¶4; Falls Tr. 12:16-13:11; 
Google Tr. 196:22-197:14; White Tr. 11:20-12:2; Falls Decl., Ex. 2. These tactics are referred to 
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as “webspam” (or “search engine manipulation”). Falls Decl., ¶4. Webspam takes different 
forms, but its aim is to trick search engines into giving some websites greater prominence in 
search results than is warranted based on the value of their content. Id. ¶4. Webspam distorts 
search results, making them less useful, relevant, and responsive. Id. ¶5. It is a form of cheating 
that diminishes the integrity of Google’s search engine, deceives users into clicking on lower-
quality websites, and pushes out sites that follow the rules. Id. ¶¶5-6; Google Tr. 196:22-197:14.  
That is why Google works hard to fight webspam. Falls Decl. ¶6; White Decl. ¶6. Doing 
so is vital to maintaining high-quality search results and maintaining users’ trust. Google Tr. 
154:1-11; Falls Decl. ¶6. Google has automated algorithms that do some of that work, but those 
software programs cannot catch everything. Falls Tr. 18:13-19:6; Kwok Tr. 14:4-12, 42:10-17; 
Falls Decl. ¶7; White Decl. ¶11. That is where Google’s experienced team of search quality ana-
lysts comes in. Google Tr. 205:15-24; Falls Decl. ¶7. Google’s analysts investigate suspected 
webspam and take “manual action” against websites found to be engaging in it. Falls Tr. 15:20-
24; Google Tr. 216:10-18; Falls Decl. ¶7; White Decl. ¶10. Manual action may involve lowering 
the ranking of websites that use deceptive tactics or excluding those sites from Google search 
results altogether. White Tr. 53:14-22; Falls Decl. ¶8.  
Google’s policies for addressing webspam are set out in the “Search Quality” portion of 
Google’s Webmaster Guidelines. Falls Decl. ¶12 & Ex. 2; Google Tr. 12:9-11, 36:24-37:3. These 
public-facing guidelines “outline some of the illicit practices that may lead to a site being re-
moved entirely from the Google index,” including “the most common forms of deceptive or 
manipulative behavior,” Falls Decl., Ex. 2. Google makes clear that websites found to be violat-
ing the Guidelines may be removed from search results. Id. ¶14 & Ex. 2. Website operators thus 
are on notice that sites are subject to removal if caught using spam tactics. Id. ¶14.  
B. Google’s Investigation of e-ventures’ Websites 
e-ventures describes itself as an online publishing and research company. SAC ¶9. It op-
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erates a network of websites, which purport to provide information about various kinds of ser-
vices, including law firms, credit card processing, insurance, and search engine optimization 
(“SEO”). Trika Tr. 42:19-44:10; e-ventures Tr. 22:15-23:18, 178:14-179:5; Falls Decl., Ex. 18. e-
ventures uses a “pay-for-play” model, where companies pay to be included on e-ventures’ lists of 
“top” services in various fields. See Trika Tr. 40:13-42:18; e-ventures Tr. 23:23-25.  
Google has repeatedly found e-ventures’ websites to be using techniques that violate 
Google’s Guidelines. Google Tr. 61:2-8; Falls Decl. ¶36-37. In 2010, e-ventures even issued a 
public apology for its behavior. Falls Decl., Ex. 4; Google Tr. 147:22-148:10. But the violations 
continued. Between 2005 and July 2014, e-ventures’ websites were subject to numerous manual 
actions by Google’s search quality team. Falls Decl. ¶36; Google Tr. 49:22-50:3. But those ac-
tions had been focused only on isolated e-ventures sites that Google happened to come across. 
Google Tr. 49:6-50:9; 51:1-14; 61:20-62:8.  
On August 25, 2014, Google’s most experienced search quality analyst, Brandon Falls 
(White Tr. 21:14-24; Falls Tr. 10:8-18), was prompted to “do a deep dive” into e-ventures’ net-
work. Falls Tr. 20:7-17. One of e-ventures’ websites, www.topseos.com, had rated as its “top” 
SEO service a malicious spam network that Mr. Falls was in the process of removing from 
search results for rampant violations of Google’s guidelines. Falls Tr. 20:3-17, 22:19-23:6; 
Google Tr. 58:12-21; Falls Decl. ¶40 & Ex. 5. Between this “red flag” (Google Tr. 59:1-11), and 
the fact that Mr. Falls had himself penalized e-ventures’ websites for prior violations on six dif-
ferent occasions (Falls Decl. ¶37), Google started a more thorough investigation. Id. ¶40; Google 
Tr. 60:21-62:1.  
Starting with topseos.com, Mr. Falls soon arrived at a list of over 350 websites that he 
was “strongly confident” were part of a single network that was “doing egregious things.” Falls 
Tr. 55:14-56:6, 72:10-12. As he started to review those sites, Mr. Falls saw significant and wide-
spread violations of Google’s Webmaster Guidelines. Google Tr. 51:1-52:1, 84:10-85:2, 94:11-
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96:13; Falls Decl. ¶42. He began to document what he was finding in an “incident” report that 
he created in Google’s manual action tool. Falls Decl. ¶41 & Ex. 16; Google Tr. 181:20-183:6; 
Falls Tr. 103:12-21. As his investigation progressed, Mr. Falls used this incident report to list the 
hundreds of e-ventures websites he had reviewed, note the violations he found, and document 
specific examples of those violations. Falls Decl. ¶¶41-43 & Ex. 16; Google Tr. 110:18-111:5, 
135:11-22, 182:13-183:6, 198:9-22; Falls Tr. 34:9-35:23, 47:15-48:8, 78:18-81:16, 124:5-125:7.  
C. e-ventures’  “Clear-Cut” Violations of the Webmaster Guidelines   
During the course of Mr. Falls’ investigation, which ultimately took him around 8 hours 
over several days in August and September 2014 (Falls Tr. 54:17-56:6), he personally reviewed 
each of the e-ventures websites that were ultimately removed from Google search results. Falls 
Decl. ¶43; Google Tr. 52:14-25, 55:5-18. Mr. Falls observed on each of those websites some vio-
lation of the Webmaster Guidelines. Google Tr. 52:14-53:16, 55:5-18, 93:25-94:10; Falls Tr. 
131:8-132:12; Falls Decl. ¶43. He focused on three types of violations, which he saw repeated 
across e-ventures’ different websites: (1) link schemes; (2) scraped content; and (3) doorway pag-
es. Google Tr. 38:11-39:11, 84:10-85:2, 94:5-96:13, 98:8-19; Falls Tr. 52:25-53:8; Falls Decl. ¶44. 
These are common tactics clearly prohibited by Google’s guidelines. Falls Decl. ¶¶16-27.1
“Link schemes” refer to the use of “[a]ny links intended to manipulate … a site’s rank-
ing in Google search results.” Falls Decl. ¶17-18 & Falls Decl., Ex. 2. Because links to a website 
generally indicate a “vote” of endorsement for that site, they are used by search engines to rank 
websites. Accordingly, websites trying to manipulate search results often try to gather unnatural 
or illegitimate links to artificially boost their rankings. Id. ¶17 & Ex. 2. This “ballot stuffing” un-
dermines the integrity of Google’s search results by tricking Google into giving greater promi-
1 These violations—and specific examples of the e-ventures websites that engaged in them—are de-
scribed in extensive detail in Mr. Falls’ attached declaration (¶¶44-51 & Exs. 6-13), Google’s interrogatory 
responses (Interrog. Resp. 3), the “incident” report that Mr. Falls created to document his investigation 
(Falls Decl., Ex. 16), and a prior declaration that Mr. Falls submitted in this case. (Dkt. 31-1).  
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nence to less deserving websites. Id. ¶21. That is what Mr. Falls observed in connection with 
many e-ventures sites. Id. ¶¶44-46. Among other things, those sites were using “forum profile 
link schemes” (which invoked fake user profiles on other sites with collections of artificial links 
to various e-ventures websites) and “expired domain link schemes” (where e-ventures accessed 
expired websites that it filled with artificial links to e-ventures sites). Id. ¶¶45-46; Interrog. Resp. 
3 at 15-16; Google Tr. 116:13-117:24, 122:2-123:23. e-ventures’ use of these schemes, along with 
other improper practices, were obvious violations of Google’s Guidelines. Falls Decl. ¶¶45-46. 
“Scraped content” refers to content copied from other websites (usually without per-
mission or attribution). Falls Decl. ¶22 & Ex. 2.  It can boost the ranking of the site copying the 
content relative to the sites that actually created the content, undermining both the efforts of the 
originating websites and the users who do not want to visit site after site with the same content. 
Id. ¶22 & Ex. 2. Mr. Falls saw many instances of scraped content on e-ventures websites, includ-
ing entire articles copied from third-party websites. Id. ¶¶48-49 (citing examples); Falls Tr. 83:15-
19, 124:5-125:7; Google Tr. 125:10-22. This was a clear indication that those websites were not 
providing high-quality unique content, but were instead attempting to cheat their way to better 
placement in search rankings, in violation of Google’s Guidelines. Falls Decl. ¶¶22, 47-49. 
“Doorway pages” are multiple webpages published by the same operator that contain 
nearly identical content. Falls Decl. ¶24 & Ex. 2. They degrade the quality of search results and 
mislead users by filling their results with multiple listings that are effectively identical. Id. ¶24. 
This also harms higher-quality websites that may be crowded out by the duplicate results. Id. Mr. 
Falls observed that many dozens of e-ventures’ websites were doorway pages that did little more 
than duplicate the content of some other e-ventures site or redirect users to another e-ventures 
property. Id. ¶¶50-51; Google Tr. 105:7-23. e-ventures’ widespread use of these doorway pages 
was deceptive webspam and an obvious violation of Google’s Guidelines. Falls Decl. ¶¶50-51. 
Having identified one or more of these tactics on hundreds of websites that were part of 
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the same network, Mr. Falls had no trouble concluding that e-ventures’ websites were violating 
Google’s guidelines on a massive scale. Id. ¶¶43-52. Given the scope and severity of the viola-
tions, and aware of e-ventures’ prior history of similar violations, Mr. Falls determined that the 
activity qualified as “pure spam,” under the guidelines. Falls Decl. ¶¶27, 52; & Ex. 2 (defining 
“pure spam” to include “repeated or egregious violations”); Google Tr. 94:11-95:15, 101:2-10; 
Falls Tr. 132:3-12; White Tr. 95:18-96:5. Based on this determination, the appropriate manual 
action was to remove from Google’s search results the entire network of websites engaging in 
these violations. Google Tr. 49:6-52:1, 84:10-19, 101:2-10, 197:25-198:7; Falls Tr. 52:24-53:15; 
Interrog. Resp. 3 at 16; Falls Decl. ¶¶52, 61-66 (explaining basis for removal). 
Mr. Falls was not the only member of his team to come to that conclusion. On Septem-
ber 15, 2014, Mr. Falls shared his incident report with his manager, Brian White. Falls Decl. ¶59 
& Ex. 15; White Decl. ¶16.2 Based on Mr. Falls’ report, as well as Mr. White’s own review of 
some of the websites, it was evident to Mr. White that e-ventures’ websites were engaging in 
“egregious” violations of Google’s guidelines. White Tr. 88:24-90:7; id. at 63:5-10, 91:21-93:23, 
114:4-18, 124:12-22; White Decl. ¶17. On September 18, Mr. Falls emailed Mr. White’s manager, 
Cody Kwok, to inform him of the decision to remove e-ventures’ websites from Google’s search 
results. Google Tr. 140:14-141:5. Mr. Falls explained that this was a “pretty clear cut-case” for 
removal, noting that e-ventures was “creating hundreds of doorway domains and sending ex-
pired domain links to them.” Falls Decl. ¶68 & Ex. 17. Mr. Kwok had no objection. Falls Decl., 
Ex. 17; Falls Tr. 83:4-84:2; Kwok Tr. 30:9-23.  
On September 18, Mr. Falls submitted the manual action, which caused the 366 e-
2 That was the same day that Google received a tip from an outside source about webspam on top-
seos.com. Falls Decl. ¶¶56 & Ex. 14. At the time this tip was received, Google’s investigation of e-
ventures was well underway. Google Tr. 56:11-13, 58:12-61:8, 93:3-9. While it corroborated much of 
what Mr. Falls observed, Google’s manual action was based not on the tip, but on its independent con-
clusion that the sites were egregiously violating Google’s Guidelines. Id. 23:5-16; Falls Decl. ¶¶52-61. 
Case 2:14-cv-00646-PAM-CM   Document 138   Filed 12/01/16   Page 14 of 31 PageID 1118
-9- 
ventures websites found in violation of the guidelines to be removed from Google’s search re-
sults. Google Tr. 46:4-47:6, 140:14-24, 183:14-17; Falls Decl. ¶69. Google’s action did not re-
move those websites from the Internet, however, and they could still be accessed directly as well 
as through other search engines. Id. While Google sent private messages to e-ventures explaining 
what had happened and how e-ventures could change its websites to allow Google to restore 
them to search results, Google made no public statement about the removal. Id. ¶¶88-89. 
D. e-ventures’ Admissions About Its Websites 
It was not just Google that concluded that e-ventures’ websites were engaging in web-
spam tactics. Shortly after the removal,  Trika Tr. 
133:8-136:15.
Willen Decl., Ex. 9.  
And e-ventures itself admitted these practices to Google when it sought to have the re-
moved websites restored to search results. Falls Decl. ¶¶77-82 & Exs. 19-20, 22-23. The day af-
ter the removal, e-ventures told Google that its “portfolio of 231 websites has now been consol-
idated to 60 websites.” Falls Decl. ¶77 & Ex. 19. This was a clear admission that 171 of the re-
moved websites were doorway pages leading to essentially identical content that e-ventures 
could immediately abandon. Google Tr. 95:17-23, 96:6-19, 217:21-218:3; White Tr. 96:18-97:19. 
Similar admissions kept coming. On October 18, 2014, e-ventures told Google that it 
had “DELETED 200+ websites” and “consolidat[ed] topseos.com to one domain, essentially 
removed all country websites, or any permutations of the topseos domains that were online to 
avoid linking penalties.” Falls Decl. ¶79 & Ex. 20; Google Tr. 98:8-19. This was a clear acknowl-
edgment that hundreds of e-ventures’ websites were duplicates that provided no unique content 
and instead existed to crowd search results and generate artificial links. Google Tr. 95:10-23, 
98:8-19; Trika Tr. 177:10-178:10, 206:8-207:4, 244:5-20; see also Interrog. Resp. 3 at 18. Subse-
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quent requests confirmed that e-ventures had also been engaging in massive content scraping: e-
ventures explained that it had removed from topseos.com over 18,000 scraped articles, 46,000 
scraped press releases, and 28,126 scraped job listings. Falls Decl. ¶81 & Ex. 22; see also id. at ¶82 & Ex. 
23. And alongside these admissions, it appeared that e-ventures was trying to circumvent 
Google’s removal action by migrating content to new websites that also violated Google’s guide-
lines. Google Tr. 192:13-194:7, 198:24-199:21; Falls Decl. ¶74; Interrog. Resp. 3 
Ultimately, as e-ventures made changes to its websites that fixed the many violations that 
had prompted Google’s manual action, Google restored those sites to search results. Falls Decl. 
¶83, 87. By November 14, 2014, Google had relisted 50 of e-ventures’ websites. Id. ¶83. e-
ventures had abandoned many of the other removed sites, effectively acknowledging that they 
had no value except as vehicles for spam. Id. ¶¶84-86; Google Tr. 99:8-17. 
E. Plaintiff’s Lawsuit Against Google  
In the face of all of this, e-ventures sued Google on November 4, 2014. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff 
moved for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. 11), but withdrew that request (Dkt. 35) after Google 
opposed it with a declaration laying out the facts described above (Dkt. 31-1 (2014 Falls Decl.)). 
Following two rounds of amendments, Google moved to dismiss the SAC. Dkt. 78. The Court 
dismissed Plaintiff’s defamation claim without prejudice (Dkt. 86, at 24), but e-ventures never 
tried to revive that claim, which is now out of the case. Willen Decl. ¶2. The Court allowed 
Plaintiff’s other claims to proceed based on the allegations in the SAC, which it accepted as true. 
Dkt. 86. But the Court made clear: “Whether or not plaintiff can support these assertions and 
carry its burden at a later stage of the proceedings is for a different day.” Dkt. 86, at 17.  
ARGUMENT 
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasona-
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ble fact finder to decide for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
248-49 (1986). “Rule 56(a) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that par-
ty’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[T]he non-moving party cannot sat-
isfy its burden if the rebuttal evidence ‘is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative’ of a 
disputed fact.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50). Google is entitled to summary judgment here based on 
two overarching federal immunities and because Plaintiff cannot carry its burden of creating a 
triable issue of fact material to any of its claims. 
I. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY SECTION 230 OF THE CDA 
Congress has spoken directly to the central issue in this case. Under section 230(c) of the 
CDA, “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s tradi-
tional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter con-
tent—are barred.’” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (emphasis added). “[C]ourts have generally accorded  
§ 230 immunity a broad scope,” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 
254-55 (4th Cir. 2009), recognizing its purpose to “prevent lawsuits from shutting down web-
sites and other services on the Internet,” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Accord Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Congress sought to encourage 
websites to make efforts to screen content without fear of liability.”). 
This protection is offered in two reinforcing ways. First, under Section 230(c)(1), no 
cause of action may be brought “for any claim that purports to treat an ‘interactive computer 
service’ ‘as the publisher or speaker of any information provided’ by someone else.” O’Kroley v. 
Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 354-55 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)). Second, Sec-
tion 230(c)(2) provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availa-
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bility of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, … harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). Both of these immunities apply here. 
Section 230(c)(1). The Court has held that Google is the provider of an “interactive 
computer service.” Dkt. 86, at 13; accord O’Kroley, 831 F.3d at 355. And because this case involves 
Google removing content provided by someone else (e-ventures), it implicates a classic publisher 
function. “[R]emoving content is something publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis of 
such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher.” Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, 
Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 
1103); id. at 1094 (“publication involves reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to 
withdraw from publication third-party content.” (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102)); see also Klay-
man v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“the very essence of publishing is mak-
ing the decision whether to print or retract a given piece of content”). That is why “any activity 
that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post 
online is perforce immune under section 230.” Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F. 
Supp. 2d 577, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Deciding whether or not to remove content or deciding 
when to remove content falls squarely within [a search engine’s] exercise of a publisher’s tradi-
tional role and is therefore subject to the CDA’s broad immunity.”). 
Applying this principle, courts have invoked Section 230(c)(1) to reject claims against 
Facebook for removing a plaintiff’s page from the service, Sikhs for Justice, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 
1094-96, and against YouTube for taking down the plaintiffs’ videos, Lancaster v. Alphabet Inc., 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88908, at *6-8 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016); Darnaa, LLC v. Google Inc., 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152126, at *21-23 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016). Google is entitled to the same 
protection here. In removing e-ventures’ websites from Google’s search results, Google made an 
editorial decision about whether to continue publishing someone else’s material. Falls Decl. ¶¶3, 
Case 2:14-cv-00646-PAM-CM   Document 138   Filed 12/01/16   Page 18 of 31 PageID 1122
-13- 
9; White Decl. ¶¶2-5. Plaintiff’s attack on that decision seeks to do exactly what the CDA for-
bids: impose “publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-
regulatory functions.” Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 
2000) (“By deleting the allegedly inaccurate stock quotation information, Defendant was simply 
engaging in the editorial functions Congress sought to protect.”). Those claims are categorically 
barred. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105 (“Subsection (c)(1), by itself, shields from liability all publication 
decisions, whether to edit, to remove, or to post, with respect to content generated entirely by 
third parties.”). And because Section 230(c)(1) has no good faith requirement, it applies “regard-
less of defendants’ alleged motive.” Darnaa, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152126, at *23 (dismissing 
tortious interference claim). That resolves this case. 
Section 230(c)(2). Section 230(c)(2) independently requires the same result. This provi-
sion provides “an additional shield from liability,” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105, for “any action vol-
untarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider … 
considers to be … harassing, or otherwise objectionable,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). “The lan-
guage of section 230(c)(2) is clearly inconsistent with state law that makes interactive service 
providers liable based on their efforts to screen content.” Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1321 n.3. It pro-
vides a “robust immunity,” Holomaxx Techs. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94316, 
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011), which gives “fairly absolute protection to those who choose to 
block.” e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 607-08 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (granting 
immunity for claims based on blocking spam); see also Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. 
Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (same).
That is exactly the situation here. It is undisputed that Google took “voluntary” action to 
“restrict” the “availability” of e-ventures’ websites in its search results (without removing those 
sites entirely from the Internet). Falls Decl. ¶¶8, 69; White Decl. ¶18. And it is clear that Google 
“consider[ed]” those sites to be “harassing or otherwise objectionable.” § 230(c)(2)(A). Just as 
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email spam (“unsolicited and bulk e-mails”) “are the sort of communications an entity like Com-
cast could deem to be objectionable,” e360Insight, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 607-08, “webspam” is ma-
terial that Google considers highly objectionable and harassing to its users. It is a form of fraud 
that distorts Google’s search results, deceives users, and drowns out higher-quality content of-
fered by other websites. Google Tr. 196:22-197:14; Falls Decl. ¶¶12-27 & Ex. 2; White Decl.  
¶¶7-9. The CDA was enacted to allow providers like Google to protect their services and users 
against this kind of harassing and objectionable material. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030 n.14. 
That leaves only the issue of good faith. Under § 230(c)(2), even a “mistaken choice to 
block, if made in good faith, cannot be the basis for liability under federal or state law.” 
e360Insight, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 609. The Court found that “plaintiff’s claims against Google are 
subject to the CDA,” but he declined to apply Section 230(c)(2) at the pleading stage because 
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that “Google failed to act in good faith when removing its websites 
from Google’s search results.” Dkt. 86, at 13-14. But this allegation has not been supported by 
discovery. The record makes abundantly clear that Google acted in good faith.
The CDA’s good faith requirement “is focused upon the provider’s subjective intent.” 
Holomaxx, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94316, at *6-7; cf. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 
F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004) (similar “good faith” requirement is subjective). Because the lan-
guage of the statute “imposes a subjective element into the determination of whether a provider 
or user is immune from liability,” e360Insight, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 608-09, what matters is not 
whether e-ventures’ websites actually violated Google’s policies (or whether a reasonable person 
might think so), but whether Google believed that they did. After all, forcing service providers “to 
litigate the question of whether what it blocked was or was not spam would render § 230(c)(2) 
nearly meaningless.” Id. at 609. It is indisputable that Google subjectively believed the websites it 
removed were engaged in tactics prohibited by the Webmaster Guidelines. Supra 4-10 & n.1; 
Falls Decl. ¶¶42-52; White Decl. ¶¶17-20. No evidence suggests otherwise. 
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Because Google is protected independently by both prongs of the CDA, it is entitled to 
summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. See, e.g., Roca Labs, Inc. v. Consumer Op. Corp., 140 F. 
Supp. 3d 1311, 1319, 1324 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (CDA’s “broad preemptive effect” barred claims 
under FDUTPA and for tortious interference). And it is vital to apply this protection now. Sec-
tion 230 provides an “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, [and] is effectively 
lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Nemet, 591 F.3d at 254. Courts “thus aim to 
resolve the question of § 230 immunity at the earliest possible stage of the case because that im-
munity protects websites not only from ‘ultimate liability,’ but also from ‘having to fight costly 
and protracted legal battles.’” Id. at 255 (quoting Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175); accord Jones v. 
Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2014) (faulting court for having let 
claims go to trial: “Given the role that the CDA plays in an open and robust internet by prevent-
ing the speech-chilling threat of the heckler’s veto, we point out that determinations of immunity 
under the CDA should be resolved at an earlier stage of litigation.”).
II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The immunity provided to search engines by Section 230 of the CDA is reinforced by 
the First Amendment. 
The central purpose of a search engine is to retrieve relevant information from 
the vast universe of data on the Internet and to organize it in a way that would 
be most helpful to the searcher. In doing so, search engines inevitably make edi-
torial judgments about what information (or kinds of information) to include in 
the results and how and where to display that information (for example, on the 
first page of the search results or later). 
Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438. These editorial judgments are “fully protected First Amendment
expression.” Id. at 439. They are no different from “the newspaper editor’s judgment of which 
wire-service stories to run and where to place them in the newspaper.” Id. at 438. 
Because the First Amendment extends to “the decision of both what to say and what not 
to say,” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988), search engines have 
the right to decide not only what to include in their results but also what to exclude. Applying 
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these principles, courts have consistently rejected claims against search engines based on their 
ranking—or exclusion—of certain websites. Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 443 (search engine had 
First Amendment right to exclude websites promoting democracy); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. 
Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007) (First Amendment required dismissal of claim seeking to 
require Google to “‘honestly’ rank Plaintiff’s websites”); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *3-4, *10-12 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (First Amendment barred 
claim that Google “maliciously” demoted and removed plaintiff’s website from search results).
In ruling on Google’s motion to dismiss, the Court agreed with Google about all this: 
“The Court has little quarrel with the cases cited by Google for the proposition that search en-
gine output results are protected by the First Amendment.” Dkt. 86, at 15. But, at that early 
stage, the Court deferred to Plaintiff’s factual allegation that by removing e-ventures’ websites 
“Google falsely stated that e-ventures’ websites failed to comply with Google’s policies.” Id. at 
15-16. The Court also held that “[w]hile publishers are entitled to discretion for editorial judg-
ment decisions, plaintiff has alleged that Google’s reasons for banning its websites was not based 
on ‘editorial judgments,’ but instead based upon anti-competitive motives.” Id. at 16. But here 
again discovery has now confirmed that Plaintiff has no support for those allegations. The First 
Amendment entitles Google to summary judgment for at least two reasons.  
First, even assuming that the removal communicated a factual statement that e-ventures’ 
websites violated Google’s policies,3 that statement was true—and it certainly was not “pub-
lished maliciously with knowledge of its falsity or serious doubts as to its truth.” Dkt. 86, at 16-
17. As the undisputed record makes clear, Google’s removal of e-ventures’ websites was the 
3 It is undisputed that Google did not make any public statement about the removal of e-ventures’ 
websites. Falls Decl. ¶¶88-89 & Ex. 24; White Decl. ¶25. And Plaintiff’s allegation that the removal action 
amounts to an implied factual statement that e-ventures’ websites had violated Google’s Guidelines (SAC 
¶¶66, 88-89, 92) is unsupported by the record. The fact that a given set of websites may not appear in 
response to a given query is not a statement that those sites violated Google’s policies, and Plaintiff has 
no evidentiary basis for treating it as such. 
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product of a thorough investigation by Brandon Falls, Google’s most experienced search quality 
analyst. See supra 4-10; Falls Decl. ¶¶42-52; White Decl. ¶¶12-20. Mr. Falls observed serious vio-
lations of multiple provisions of Google’s Webmaster Guidelines on each of the hundreds of e-
ventures’ websites that were ultimately removed. Google Tr. 52:14-25; Falls Decl. ¶43 & Exs. 6-
13. What he saw were textbook examples of spam tactics forbidden by Google’s guidelines. 
Google Tr. 101:2-10; Falls Decl. ¶¶42-52, 73. Mr. Falls documented his findings in a report that 
he shared with his manager, who reviewed the report and came to the same conclusion. Falls Tr. 
83:4-84:21; Falls Decl. ¶¶59 & Ex. 16 (excerpts of report), Ex. 15; White Decl. ¶¶17-18.  
e-ventures has no contrary evidence, and certainly nothing to create a triable issue of fact. 
That is only highlighted by its own admissions. Following the removal, e-ventures acknowledged 
that its websites had used improper tactics, including hundreds of doorway pages and massive 
amounts of scraped content (Falls Decl. ¶¶77-82 & Exs. 19-20, 22-23), and Plaintiff’s own con-
sultant agreed that e-ventures’ linking practices were (Willen Decl., Ex. 9). 
No reasonable person reviewing this record could conclude that Google had any “serious doubts” 
about whether e-ventures had violated the Webmaster Guidelines. Dkt. 86, at 16-17. Thus, even 
assuming that Google somehow communicated a factual statement through its removal action, 
Google is entitled to full First Amendment protection.4
Second, the record makes equally clear that the removal of e-ventures’ websites was a pro-
tected editorial decision not based on any “anti-competitive motives.” There were three people 
4 Google maintains that all of its decisions regarding what should appear in search results—whether 
how to rank websites or whether a site should be included—are protected by the First Amendment be-
cause they are “fundamentally subjective in nature” and, as a matter of law, not capable of being proven 
false. Search King, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *10-12. Google disagrees with the artificial distinction 
between ranking and removal decisions. Dkt. 86, at 15-16. That ignores, among other things, that the 
cases applying the First Amendment to search engines involved exclusions, not just rankings. See Zhang, 
10 F. Supp. 3d at 434; Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 626-27; Search King, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at 
*3-4. While the Court accepted that distinction at the pleading stage, it is not supported by the record, 
which makes clear that Google’s removal action was based on a protected opinion. Falls Decl. ¶¶2-3; 
White Decl. ¶¶3-5, 8-10. Nonetheless, even based on the First Amendment framework set out in the 
Court’s Order, Google is entitled to summary judgment.  
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involved in Google’s decision: Mr. Falls, Mr. White, and Mr. Kwok. Plaintiff can point to no ev-
idence that they even considered whether e-ventures could be a competitor of Google, much 
less acted with any thought of inflicting competitive harm. Google Tr. 81:13-20, 121:9-19, 
200:20-201:5; Falls Decl. ¶¶70-71; White Decl. ¶28. Nor did the decision to remove the websites 
have anything to do with e-ventures’ involvement in the SEO industry. Falls Decl. ¶¶70-71; 
White Decl. ¶¶26-27, 29; Google Tr. 70:6-11, 144:1-17; White Tr. 35:23-36:7, 78:8-20. As the 
undisputed evidence confirms, Google was motivated by only one thing: the fact that its investi-
gation found serious violations of its guidelines across hundreds of websites operated by e-
ventures. Falls Decl. ¶70; White Decl. ¶¶17-19, 29; Google Tr. 119:21-120:15, 142:20-143:20, 
200:20-201:5; Falls Tr. 52:24-53:15; White Tr. 111:6-16. In taking action against this activity, 
Google’s aim was nothing more (and nothing less) than to protect the integrity of its service and 
ensure that its users would receive the most relevant and useful search results. Falls Decl. ¶¶70.5
Google’s “exercise of editorial control and judgment” regarding what websites to include 
in search results is protected by the First Amendment. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241, 258 (1974); Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 441. By making such decisions, including the decision 
to remove e-ventures’ websites, Google offers its judgment about what information is most rele-
vant and useful for its users. Falls Decl. ¶3; White Decl. ¶3. Allowing Plaintiff to premise liability 
on that judgment would violate “the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, 
that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.” Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). 
5 Plaintiff has suggested that Google acted to increase ad revenue. SAC ¶¶15-18. This theory is flatly 
contrary to the evidence. Falls Decl. ¶70; White Decl. ¶¶34-38. Indeed, under Google’s policies, the e-
ventures websites that were removed from search results were not allowed, while that removal was in 
effect, to run ads through Google’s AdWords program. White Decl. ¶¶35-37 & Ex. 1. With that block in 
place, Google would not have earned revenue from ads seeking to drive traffic to the removed websites. 
White Decl. ¶37; RFA Resp. 4. But even where a publisher engages in editorial conduct “with a view to-
ward increased sales,” it is “incompatible with the First Amendment” to regulate its decisions on that 
basis. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).  
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III. PLAINTIFF CANNOT CARRY ITS BURDEN ON ANY OF ITS CLAIMS 
Even apart from these statutory and constitutional protections, Google is entitled to 
summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot carry its burden on any of its remaining claims.  
A. Plaintiff Has No Viable Claim Under the Lanham Act  
Section 1125(a) of the Lanham Act “creates two distinct bases of liability: false associa-
tion, § 1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising, § 1125(a)(1)(B).” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components , Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (2014); see also Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 
1312-13 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiff “has not alleged a claim for false advertising.” Dkt. 86, 
at 19. Thus, the only claim at issue is under Section 1125(a)(1)(A). But there is no legal or factual 
basis for applying that provision to this case.6
“Because of its inherently limited wording, [the Lanham Act] can never be a federal codi-
fication of the overall law of unfair competition, but can apply only to certain unfair trade prac-
tices prohibited by its text.” Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 
(2003). The text of Section 1125(a)(1)(A) creates liability only against someone who, “in connec-
tion with any goods or services,” makes a “false or misleading representation of fact” that “is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or associa-
tion of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (emphases 
added). This language does not create a general “tort of misrepresentation, actionable as to any 
goods or services in commerce affected by the misrepresentation.” Halicki v. United Artists 
Commc’ns, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff would have to show not just that 
Google made a false representation, but that the representation was likely to cause “confusion as 
6 Plaintiff’s 1125(a)(1)(A) claim is procedurally tenuous, given e-ventures’ express and repeated repre-
sentations that it was only seeking to assert a claim under Section 1125(a)(1)(B). Dkt. 63, at 19-20; Dkt. 
79, at 20. Google reserves all of its rights in that respect. Dkt. 87. Moreover, even though the Court de-
clined to dismiss the Lanham Act claim, it made clear that it never ruled that Plaintiff had “adequately 
stated a claim under Section 1125(a)(1)(A).” Dkt. 103, at 4.  
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to plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement of the defendant’s goods or services,” Register.com, Inc. 
v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 441-42 (2d Cir. 2004), or about the “origin, sponsorship, or approval” 
of Google’s services or commercial activities by someone else, e.g., Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32. 
There is nothing remotely like that here. First, Google did not make a “false or mislead-
ing representation of fact” in connection with any of its “goods or services.” Google did not 
make any representation of fact to the public about e-ventures in connection with the removal 
action. See supra n. 3; Falls Decl. ¶88-89; White Decl. ¶25. But even if it had, as discussed above, 
any implied statement that Google had determined that e-ventures violated the Guidelines was 
true, and no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. See supra 4-10, 16-17. 
Second, Plaintiff cannot show that any such statement would likely have “caused confu-
sion” about the “affiliation,” “connection,” or “association” between Google and e-ventures (or 
anyone else). Indeed, e-ventures has not even alleged that Google ever created a misleading asso-
ciation of the sort covered by Section 1125(a)(1)(A) (SAC ¶¶63-71), and there certainly is no evi-
dence to support such a claim. White Decl. ¶25. Plaintiff similarly has not pleaded, much less 
come forward with evidence, that Google’s removal action suggested anything misleading re-
garding “the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [Google’s] goods, services, or commercial activi-
ties by another person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). The theory set out in the SAC is not that 
Google somehow tricked the public into believing that Google is affiliated with e-ventures or 
that e-ventures (or anyone else) approved Google’s services or activities. Instead, Plaintiff claims 
that Google allegedly deceived consumers “into believing that e-ventures’ websites had violated 
Google’s removal policies.” SAC ¶66. In addition to being wholly unsupported by the record, 
that theory has nothing to do with false association and is not actionable under §1125(a)(1)(A).  
B. Plaintiff Has No Support For Its FDUTPA Claim  
FDUTPA prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Fla. Stat. 
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Ann. § 501.204(1). Here, however, Plaintiff cannot show that Google engaged in an unfair prac-
tice or deceptive act. An “unfair practice is one that offends established public policy and one 
that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” 
PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003). Google’s removal of e-
ventures’ websites from search results, based on its determination that they were using prohibit-
ed spam tactics to deceive Google’s search engine, offends no public policy. To the contrary, 
this action protected consumers, including search engine users and legitimate website operators, 
from harm. Google Tr. 154:1-11, 196:22-197:14; Falls Decl. ¶¶4-6.  
The only basis on which the Court allowed Plaintiff’s claim to survive Google’s motion 
to dismiss was the bare allegation that “Google removed its websites from its search results for 
anti-competitive and punitive reasons.” Dkt. 86, at 22. But nothing in the record supports these 
assertions. As described above, the undisputed evidence shows that Google acted for only one 
reason: to protect its search results, and therefore its users, from websites that it concluded were 
violating the Webmaster Guidelines. There is no support for Plaintiff’s claim that Google con-
sidered e-ventures to be a competitor, much less that it acted with any goal of diminishing com-
petition. Falls Decl. ¶71; White Decl. ¶¶26-29 ; Google Tr. 121:9-19, 144:14-17; e-ventures Tr. 
243:21-245:4 ( ). Nor is 
there any basis for Plaintiff’s claim that Google acted to increase ad revenues. See supra n. 5. 
It is equally clear that e-ventures has no viable deception claim. Plaintiff would have to 
make “a showing of probable, not possible, deception that is likely to cause injury to a reasona-
ble relying consumer.” Zlotnick v. Premier Sales Grp., Inc., 480 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(quotations omitted). No reasonable jury could make such a finding. Google makes abundantly 
clear to the public that it will act against websites found to be using spam tactics, and that is ex-
actly what it did here. Falls Decl. ¶¶14-16 & Ex. 2; White Decl. ¶¶8-9; Google Tr. 120:4-15, 
154:1-11, 200:24-201:5; Falls Tr. 52:24-53:15. The Webmaster Guidelines describe each violation 
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that e-ventures committed and make clear not only that Google is “willing to take manual action 
on sites that use spammy techniques,” but that violations “may lead to a site being removed en-
tirely from the Google index.” Falls Decl. ¶¶15 & Ex. 2; White Decl. ¶9; Google Tr. 120:4-15; 
Falls Tr. 52:24-53:15. Plaintiff cannot bring a deception claim against Google for doing what it 
said it would do. See Zlotnick, 480 F.3d at 1287 (rejecting FDUTPA claim where defendant’s 
statements “eliminated any possibility that a reasonable [consumer] would be misled”).7
C. Plaintiff’s Tortious Interference Claim Is Legally And Factually Baseless 
Google is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s tortious interference claim for two 
reasons. First, as the Court recognized, under Florida’s “single publication/single action rule,” a 
plaintiff cannot maintain a tortious interference claim arising “from the same publication upon 
which a failed defamation claim is based.” Dkt. 86, at 25. This “rule is designed to prevent plain-
tiffs from circumventing a valid defense to defamation by recasting essentially the same facts 
into several causes of action.” Id. at 26. At the pleading stage, the Court agreed that this rule ap-
plied, but held that it was “premature” to dismiss the tortious interference claim because the 
defamation claim was dismissed without prejudice, and “plaintiff may or may not choose to seek 
to amend and re-assert its defamation cause of action.” Id. In response, however, e-ventures 
chose not to revive its defamation claim. Because that claim is out of the case for good, the single 
publication rule now bars the tortious interference claim. Plaintiff cannot recast its failed defa-
mation allegations into a different cause of action meant to “compensate for the same harm.” 
Callaway Land & Cattle Co. v. Banyon Lakes C. Corp., 831 So. 2d 204, 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 002). 
Second, e-ventures cannot carry its burden of proving that Google engaged in an “inten-
tional and unjustified interference with” e-ventures’ contractual or business relationships. Ethan 
7 Nor can Plaintiff make out a deception claim by arguing that Google’s removal of e-ventures’ web-
sites was itself a misleading statement that those sites violated the Webmaster Guidelines. As described 
above, while Google made no public statement about e-ventures, any possible implication from the re-
moval that Google had found e-ventures’ websites in violation of the guidelines was true. See supra 16-17, 
19-20.  
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Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1994). The Court allowed Plaintiff to 
survive a motion to dismiss based on the allegations in the SAC (Dkt. 86, at 27-28), but discov-
ery has shown that e-ventures cannot support those allegations. A tortious interference claim 
requires deliberate, wrongful conduct. Pharma Supply, Inc. v. Stein, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71183, 
at *21 (S.D. Fla. June 2, 2015). Here, however, even assuming that Google knew about e-
ventures’ specific contractual or business relationships, which it did not (Google Tr. 81:13-20), 
there is nothing in the record to suggest that Google was trying intentionally to harm those rela-
tionships, much less that it did so through legally improper means. The undisputed facts show 
that Google applied its established guidelines to protect its users against websites that it deter-
mined were engaged in deceptive tactics. See supra 4-10; Falls Decl. ¶¶70, 72; White Decl. ¶¶8-9, 
17-20. There is no genuine issue for trial on this point.   
Under established Florida law, taking protective measures to ensure the integrity of one’s 
service cannot give rise to tortious interference. Genet Co. v. Annheuser-Busch, Inc., 498 So. 2d 683, 
684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (“there can be no claim where the action complained of is under-
taken to safeguard or promote one’s financial or economic interest”); FSC Franchise Co., LLC v. 
Express Corp. Apparel, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133235, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2009) 
(same). e-ventures cannot overcome that rule. Because there is no evidence of any “intent to in-
terfere,” summary judgment “must be granted.” Ingenuity, Inc. v. Linshell Innovations Ltd., 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 40336, at *18 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2014); Border Collie Rescue, Inc. v. Ryan, 418 F. Supp. 
2d 1330, 1344-45 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (granting summary judgment absent “evidence that [defend-
ants] intentionally and unjustifiably interfered with plaintiffs’ … business relationship”). 
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Google respectfully requests that the Court grant summary 
judgment on all of the claims in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.
Case 2:14-cv-00646-PAM-CM   Document 138   Filed 12/01/16   Page 29 of 31 PageID 1133
-24- 
Dated:  December 1, 2016   Respectfully submitted, 
/S/ NATHAN M. BERMAN 
NATHAN BERMAN, Fla. Bar No. 0329230 
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP 
101 East Kennedy Blvd.  
Suite 1200 
Tampa, FL 33602 
(813) 221-1010 
Email: nberman@zuckerman.com 
BRIAN M. WILLEN (admitted pro hac vice) 
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati 
1301 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor 
New York, NY  10019 
(212) 497-7700 
Email: bwillen@wsgr.com 
Counsel for Google Inc.
Case 2:14-cv-00646-PAM-CM   Document 138   Filed 12/01/16   Page 30 of 31 PageID 1134
-25- 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 1, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing with the 
Clerk of the Court using the Court’s CM/ECF system.  
/s/ Nathan M. Berman  
Nathan M. Berman  
Case 2:14-cv-00646-PAM-CM   Document 138   Filed 12/01/16   Page 31 of 31 PageID 1135
